Pensees #233, Pascal's Wager, and Context

Pascal's Wager and Context

Thanks to http://philosophy.eserver.org/pascal-pensees.txt

 

                                       1660

                                    PENSEES

                                by Blaise Pascal

                          translated by W. F. Trotter

 

    220. The fallacy of philosophers who have not discussed the

immortality of the soul. The fallacy of their dilemma in Montaigne.

    221. Atheists ought to say what is perfectly evident; now it is

not perfectly evident that the soul is material.

    222. Atheists.- What reason have they for saying that we cannot

rise from the dead? What is more difficult, to be born or to rise

again; that what has never been should be, or that what has been

should be again? Is it more difficult to come into existence than to

return to it? Habit makes the one appear easy to us; want of habit

makes the other impossible. A popular way of thinking!

    Why cannot a virgin bear a child? Does a hen not lay eggs

without a cock? What distinguishes these outwardly from others? And

who has told us that the hen may not form the germ as well as the

cock?

    223. What have they to say against the resurrection, and against

the child-bearing of the Virgin? Which is the more difficult, to

produce a man or an animal, or to reproduce it? And if they had

never seen any species of animals, could they have conjectured whether

they were produced without connection with each other?

    224. How I hate these follies of not believing in the Eucharist,

etc.! If the Gospel be true, if Jesus Christ be God, what difficulty

is there?

    225. Atheism shows strength of mind, but only to a certain degree.

    226. Infidels, who profess to follow reason, ought to be

exceedingly strong in reason. What say they then? "Do we not see," say

they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like

Christians? They have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors,

their saints, their monks, like us," etc. (Is this contrary to

Scripture? Does it not say all this?)

    If you care but little to know the truth, here is enough of it

to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to

know it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. This would be

sufficient for a question in philosophy; but not here, where it

concerns your all. And yet, after a trifling reflection of this

kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same

religion whether it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps

it will teach it to us.

     227. Order by dialogues.- What ought I to do? I see only darkness

everywhere. Shall I believe I am nothing? Shall I believe I am God?

    "All things change and succeed each other." You are mistaken;

there is...

    228. Objection of atheists: "But we have no light."

    229. This is what I see and what troubles me. I look on all sides,

and I see only darkness everywhere. Nature presents to me nothing

which is not matter of doubt and concern. If I saw nothing there which

revealed a Divinity, I would come to a negative conclusion; if I saw

everywhere the signs of a Creator, I would remain peacefully in faith.

But, seeing too much to deny and too little to be sure, I am in a

state to be pitied; wherefore I have a hundred times wished that if

a God maintains Nature, she should testify to Him unequivocally, and

that, if the signs she gives are deceptive, she should suppress them

altogether; that she should say everything or nothing, that I might

see which cause I ought to follow. Whereas in my present state,

ignorant of what I am or of what I ought to do, I know neither my

condition nor my duty. My heart inclines wholly to know where is the

true good, in order to follow it; nothing would be too dear to me

for eternity.

    I envy those whom I see living in the faith with such carelessness

and who make such a bad use of a gift of which it seems to me I

would make such a different use.

    230. It is incomprehensible that God should exist, and it is

incomprehensible that He should not exist; that the soul should be

joined to the body, and that we should have no soul; that the world

should be created, and that it should not be created, etc.; that

original sin should be, and that it should not be.

    231. Do you believe it to be impossible that God is infinite,

without parts? Yes. I wish therefore to show you an infinite and

indivisible thing. It is a point moving everywhere with an infinite

velocity; for it is one in all places and is all totality in every

place.

    Let this effect of nature, which previously seemed to you

impossible, make you know that there may be others of which you are

still ignorant. Do not draw this conclusion from your experiment, that

there remains nothing for you to know; but rather that there remains

an infinity for you to know.

    232. Infinite movement, the point which fills everything, the

moment of rest; infinite without quantity, indivisible and infinite.

    233. Infinite- nothing.- Our soul is cast into a body, where it

finds number, dimension. Thereupon it reasons, and calls this nature

necessity, and can believe nothing else.

    Unity joined to infinity adds nothing to it, no more than one foot

to an infinite measure. The finite is annihilated in the presence of

the infinite, and becomes a pure nothing. So our spirit before God, so

our justice before divine justice. There is not so great a

disproportion between our justice and that of God as between unity and

infinity.

    The justice of God must be vast like His compassion. Now justice

to the outcast is less vast and ought less to offend our feelings than

mercy towards the elect.

    We know that there is an infinite, and are ignorant of its nature.

As we know it to be false that numbers are finite, it is therefore

true that there is an infinity in number. But we do not know what it

is. It is false that it is even, it is false that it is odd; for the

addition of a unit can make no change in its nature. Yet it is a

number, and every number is odd or even (this is certainly true of

every finite number). So we may well know that there is a God

without knowing what He is. Is there not one substantial truth, seeing

there are so many things which are not the truth itself?

    We know then the existence and nature of the finite, because we

also are finite and have extension. We know the existence of the

infinite and are ignorant of its nature, because it has extension like

us, but not limits like us. But we know neither the existence nor

the nature of God, because He has neither extension nor limits.

    But by faith we know His existence; in glory we shall know His

nature. Now, I have already shown that we may well know the

existence of a thing, without knowing its nature.

    Let us now speak according to natural lights.

    If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since,

having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then

incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who

will dare to undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who

have no affinity to Him.

    Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason

for their belief, since they profess a religion for which they

cannot give a reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world,

that it is a foolishness, stultitiam;* and then you complain that they

do not prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it

is in lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense. "Yes, but

although this excuses those who offer it as such and takes away from

them the blame of putting it forward without reason, it does not

excuse those who receive it." Let us then examine this point, and say,

"God is, or He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can

decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us.

A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance

where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to

reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to

reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.

 

    * I Cor. 1. 21.

 

    Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice;

for you know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having

made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses

heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both

in the wrong. The true course is not to wager at all."

    Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked.

Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let

us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the

true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will,

your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to

shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one

rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one

point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the

loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If

you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then,

without hesitation that He is. "That is very fine. Yes, I must

wager; but I may perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is

an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two

lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were

three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the

necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced

to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there

is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life

and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of

chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be

right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being

obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game

in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if

there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But

there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a

chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what

you stake is finite. It is all divided; where-ever the infinite is and

there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain,

there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And thus, when one is

forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather

than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of

nothingness.

    For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is

certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the

certainly of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be

gained, equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the

uncertain infinite. It is not so, as every player stakes a certainty

to gain an uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to gain a

finite uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not

an infinite distance between the certainty staked and the

uncertainty of the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an

infinity between the certainty of gain and the certainty of loss.

But the uncertainty of the gain is proportioned to the certainty of

the stake according to the proportion of the chances of gain and loss.

Hence it comes that, if there are as many risks on one side as on

the other, the course is to play even; and then the certainty of the

stake is equal to the uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from

fact that there is an infinite distance between them. And so our

proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in

a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the

infinite to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of

any truths, this is one.

    "I confess it, I admit it. But, still, is there no means of seeing

the faces of the cards?" Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc. "Yes, but I

have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am

not free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe.

What, then, would you have me do?"

    True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason

brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour, then, to

convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the

abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith and do

not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and

ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you,

and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the

way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you

would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if

they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even

this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.

"But this is what I am afraid of." And why? What have you to lose?

    But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will

lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.

    The end of this discourse.- Now, what harm will befall you in

taking this side? You will be faithful, humble, grateful, generous,

a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those

poisonous pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I

will tell you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at

each step you take on this road, you will see so great certainty of

gain, so much nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last

recognise that you have wagered for something certain and infinite,

for which you have given nothing.

    "Ah! This discourse transports me, charms me," etc.

    If this discourse pleases you and seems impressive, know that it

is made by a man who has knelt, both before and after it, in prayer to

that Being, infinite and without parts, before whom he lays all he

has, for you also to lay before Him all you have for your own good and

for His glory, that so strength may be given to lowliness.

    234. If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act

on religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an

uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at

all, for nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in

religion than there is as to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is

not certain that we may see to-morrow, and it is certainly possible

that we may not, see it. We cannot say as much about religion. It is

not certain that it is; but who will venture to say that it is

certainly possible that it is not? Now when we work for to-morrow, and

so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we ought to work for an

uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which was demonstrated

above.

    Saint Augustine has seen that we work for an uncertainty, on

sea, in battle, etc. But he has not seen the doctrine of chance

which proves that we should do so. Montaigne has seen that we are

shocked at a fool, and that habit is all-powerful; but he has not seen

the reason of this effect.

    All these persons have seen the effects, but they have not seen

the causes. They are, in comparison with those who have discovered the

causes, as those who have only eyes are in comparison with those who

have intellect. For the effects are perceptible by sense, and the

causes are visible only to the intellect. And although these effects

are seen by the mind, this mind is, in comparison with the mind

which sees the causes, as the bodily senses are in comparison with the

intellect.

    235. Rem viderunt, causam non viderunt.*

 

    * "They have seen the thing; they have not seen the cause." St.

Augustine, Contra Pelagium, iv.

 

    236. According to the doctrine of chance, you ought to put

yourself to the trouble of searching for the truth; for if you die

without worshipping the True Cause, you are lost. "But," say you,

"if He had wished me to worship Him, He would have left me signs of

His will." He has done so; but you neglect them. Seek them, therefore;

it is well worth it.

    237. Chances.- We must live differently in the world, according to

these different assumptions: (1) that we could always remain in it;

(2) that it is certain that we shall not remain here long, and

uncertain if we shall remain here one hour. This last assumption is

our condition.

    238. What do you then promise me, in addition to certain troubles,

but ten years of self-love (for ten years is the chance), to try

hard to please without success?

    239. Objection.- Those who hope for salvation are so far happy;

but they have as a counterpoise the fear of hell.

    Reply.- Who has most reason to fear hell: he who is in ignorance

whether there is a hell, and who is certain of damnation if there

is; or he who certainly believes there is a hell and hopes to be saved

if there is?

    240. "I would soon have renounced pleasure," say they, "had I

faith." For my part I tell you, "You would soon have faith, if you

renounced pleasure." Now, it is for you to begin. If I could, I

would give you faith. I cannot do so, nor therefore test the truth

of what you say. But you can well renounce pleasure and test whether

what I say is true.

    241. Order.- I would have far more fear of being mistaken, and

of finding that the Christian religion was true, than of not being

mistaken in believing it true.

 

 

SECTION IV

OF THE MEANS OF BELIEF